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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, : Case No. 960667-CA 
v. : 
ROBERT HANGARTNER, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant and Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant was convicted of assault by a prisoner, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.5 (1974), interference with an arresting officer, 
i class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-8-305 (1990), and simple 
assault, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102 (1991). 
rhis Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Since defendant pled guilty at his first trial, and requested six 
:ontinuances before his second trial (including one the morning of trial), did he 
waive a speedy trial? A defendant's guilty plea waives his right to claim a violation of 
i right to a speedy trial. State v. Brocksmith. 888 P.2d 703, 706 (Utah App. 1994) 
citing Tollett v. Henderson. 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1608 (1973)). 
Defendant raised the speedy trial issue in a motion to dismiss at trial. "The 
propriety of a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss is a question of 
law that [an appellate court reviews] for correctness." Tiede v. State. 915 P.2d 500, 
502 (Utah 1996). 
2. Since defendant has failed to marshal the evidence, should this Court 
decline to consider his insufficiency claim? If the merits are considered, was the 
evidence sufficient to convict defendant of assault by a prisoner? "When 
challenging a jury verdict, a defendant must marshal all the evidence supporting that 
verdict and then demonstrate why that evidence is insufficient to support the 
conviction." State V, FaiTQw, 919 P.2d 50, 53 n.l (Utah App. 1996) (citing State v, 
Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah App. 1990)). When a defendant fails to meet this 
marshaling burden, this Court will decline to consider an insufficiency claim. Id. 
When a jury verdict is challenged on insufficiency grounds, this Court reviews 
the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in 
the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. [This Court will] 
reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted. 
State V, Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 235 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted); s££ alSQ State vt 
JBlllk, 839 P.2d 880 (Utah App.), cert.denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
3. Since defendant failed to exercise a peremptory challenge against the 
juror he had challenged for cause, has he preserved for appeal the trial court's 
denial of his challenge for cause? "[I]n order to preserve the error on appeal, a 
criminal defendant must exercise a peremptory challenge, if one is available, against 
the juror unsuccessfully challenged for cause." State v. Baker. 935 P.2d 503, 510 
(Utah 1997). 
4. Since defendant failed to move to recuse the judge at trial and failed to 
preserve any basis for recusal, has he waived an recusal issue on appeal? "To be 
timely, a motion to disqualify should be filed at counsel's first opportunity after 
learning of the disqualifying facts. Only if good cause for a delay is demonstrated in 
the motion seeking disqualification should a delinquent motion even be considered." 
Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan. 767 P.2d 538, 543 (Utah 1988). 
5. Since he failed to properly object to the prosecutor's cross-examination at 
trial, and has failed to assert plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal, 
has defendant failed to establish a basis for this Court's review? This Court will 
reverse on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct only if defendant has shown that 
the actions or remarks of [prosecuting] counsel call to the attention of the 
jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in determining its 
verdict and, if so, under the circumstances of the particular case, . . . the 
error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable 
result. . . . 
State v. Tenney. 913 P.2d 750 (Utah App. 1996)(quoting State v. Wright. 893 P.2d 
1113, 1118 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting State v. Peters. 796 P.2d 708, 712 (Utah App. 
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1990) (citation omitted)); accord State v. Trov. 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984); £&££ 
v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1290 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied. 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 
1995). In determining whether a given statement constitutes prosecutorial misconduct, 
"the statement must be viewed in light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial. 
Further, because the trial court is in the best position to determine the impact of a 
statement upon the proceedings, its rulings on whether the prosecutor's conduct merits 
a mistrial will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion." LL (citing State v. 
Gardner. 789 P.2d 273, 287 (Utah 1989), fifiiLdsnieii, 116 S.Ct. 97 (1990)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Constitution, amend. VI: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . . 
Utah Constitution, Art. 1, §12: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have to r ight . . . to have 
a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which 
the offense is alleged to have been committed . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. §77-l-6(l)(f) and (h) (1980): 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: . . . 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district where the offense is alleged to have been committed; . . . 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or 
be entitled to trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail 
and if the business of the court permits. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c): 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or 
omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, 
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stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his 
objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be 
assigned to instructions in order to avoid a manifest injustice. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 29(c) and (d): 
(c) If the prosection or a defendant in any criminal action or 
proceeding files an affidavit that the judge before whom the action or 
proceeding is to be tried or heard has a bias or prejudice, either against 
the party or his attorney or in favor of any opposing party to the suit, the 
judge shall proceed no further until the challenge is disposed of. Every 
affidavit shall state the facts and die reasons for the belief that the bias or 
prejudice exists and shall be filed as soon as practicable after the case has 
been assigned or the bias or prejudice is known. No affidavit may be 
filed unless accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record that the 
affidavit and application are made in good faith. 
(d) If the challenged judge questions the sufficiency of the 
allegation of disqualification, he shall enter an order directing that a copy 
be forthwith certified to another named judge of the same court or of a 
court of like jurisdiction, which judge shall then pass upon the legal 
sufficiency of the allegations. If the challenged judge does not question 
the legal sufficiency of the affidavit, or if the judge to whom the affidavit 
is certified finds that it is legally sufficient, another judge shall be called 
to try the case or to conduct the proceeding. If the judge to whom the 
affidavit is certified does not find the affidavit to be legally sufficient, he 
shall enter a finding to that effect and the challenged judge shall proceed 
with the case or proceeding. 
Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1) and (d): 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon 
a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of 
the party is affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a 
timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific 
ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the 
context . . . . 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of 
plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to 
the attention of the court. 
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Utah R. Evid. 404(b): 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
Utah R. Evid. 608(b): 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of conduct of 
a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' 
credibility, other than conviction of a crime as provided in Rule 609, may 
not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the 
discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be 
inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the 
witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which 
character the witness being cross-examined has testified. 
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other 
witness, does not operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness' 
privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters 
which relate only to credibility. 
Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1): 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a 
witness, 
(1) . . . evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a 
crime [punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year] shall 
be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting 
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused . . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Since it is crucial to Issue I, a detailed chronology of case events is set forth 
below: 
On June 7, 1994 defendant was arrested and incarcerated (R. 9-13). 
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On June 22, 1994 defendant made an oral motion at his preliminary hearing for 
the assigned judge, the Honorable Clint S. Judkins to recuse himself (R. 20, 287-290, 
addendum A). Defendant stipulated to a delay pending resolution of the motion (R. 
289-290). Although the trial court ordered that the motion be filed in writing (R. 290; 
see Utah R. Crim. P. 29(c) and (d)), no affidavit or order on the motion appears in the 
record. 
After a preliminary hearing before a different judge on July 15, 1994 (R. 23-27; 
200-284), defendant was bound over on all counts (R. 28, 284). 
On August 1, 1994 defendant was arraigned and entered pleas of not guilty (R. 
32). Trial was set for August 22 and 23, 1994 (R. 38). 
On August 22, 1994 defendant pled guilty to counts 2 and 4 (assault by a 
prisoner and simple assault), and counts 1 and 3 were to be dismissed 30 days after 
sentencing. Sentencing was set for September 26, 1994 (R. 40, 42). Defendant was 
released from jail (R. 40).1 
On September 21, 1994 defendant filed a letter requesting to withdraw his guilty 
plea (R. 44-48). 
On September 26, 1994 defendant was not present at a hearing, and defense 
counsel requested his first continuance, which the trial court granted. The hearing was 
1
 The trial was held within 30 days after arraignment. Sfifi Utah Code Ann. 
§77-l-6(l)(h) (1982); R. 356-357). 
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reset for October 11, 1994 (R. 49-51). 
On October 7, 1994 the State filed its Objection to Defendant's Request to 
Withdraw A Guilty Plea (R. 52-56). 
On October 11, 1994 defendant was not present at a hearing, and defense 
counsel requested a second continuance, which the trial court granted R. 57). The 
hearing was reset for October 24, 1994 (R. 57-60). 
On October 24, 1994 defendant was present at a hearing on his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. The State stipulated to defendant's continued release pending 
a hearing on November 7, 1994 (R. 61-63). 
On November 5, 1994 defendant filed a 26-page Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea (R. 67-93). 
On November 7, 1994, at a hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea, the State sought more time to respond to defendant's 26-page memorandum filed 
two days before. The hearing was continued to December 5, 1994 (R. 65-66). 
On November 18, 1994 the State filed its Supplemental Reply to Defendant's 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea (R. 94-95). 
At a hearing on December 5, 1994 defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea was granted (R. 96). His trial was set for March 21 and 22, 1995 (R. 96-98). 
On February 27, 1995 an amended notice was served on counsel setting the trial 
for July 20 and 21, 1995 (R. 99-100). 
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On February 28, 1995 a second amended notice was served on counsel setting 
the trial for May 25 and 26, 1995 (R. 101-102). 
Defendant was not present at a May 19, 1995 status hearing, and defense 
counsel moved for a third continuance. The trial court ordered a document regarding 
defendant's status to be filed on June 5, 1995 (R. 103). 
On May 24, 1995 defendant stipulated to dismiss the jury for the May 25, 1995 
trial because the trial had been continued (R. 104-105). 
On June 5, 1995 notice of trial was mailed to counsel setting the trial for August 
2 and 3, 1995 (R. 106-107). 
On July 31, 1995 defendant filed a written motion for a fourth continuance (R. 
108-111). On August 1,1995 defense counsel filed an affidavit asserting that defendant 
had been hospitalized for injuries, and requesting that trial be continued "until he has 
recovered from the injuries" (R. 111). The trial court granted a continuance (R. 114). 
On October 30, 1995 notice was mailed to counsel setting the trial for January 
18 and 19, 1996 (R. 115-116). 
On January 17, 1996 defendant filed a written motion for a. fifth continuance, 
asserting that defendant's flight from Las Vegas, Nevada to Salt Lake City, Utah had 
been canceled because of weather (R. 117-124). A hearing was held on the motion (R. 
126), and the trial court granted a continuance, directing a trial date u[t]o be set as soon 
as possible" (R. 126; emphasis added). 
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On January 30, 1996 notice was mailed to counsel setting the trial for April 30 
and May 1, 1996 (R. 127-128). 
On the morning of his trial on April 30, 1996, defendant was intoxicated. 
Defense counsel asked for a sixth continuance. Ultimately jury selection proceeded. 
After the jury was selected, sworn, instructed, and excused for the day, defendant made 
a rule 25, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, motion to dismiss based on an 
"unreasonable or unconstitutional delay" in bringing his case to trial (R. 129-130, 354-
355). The trial court denied the motion (R. 356-360). 
On May 1, 1996 defendant was convicted on three of four counts (R. 164). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
The only charge defendant disputes on appeal is count 2, assault by a prisoner 
(Def. Br. at 8-10; S££ Point II, below). Therefore, a complete recitation of the facts 
regarding his other offenses is unnecessary. 
After an argument with his estranged wife, defendant threw a hunting knife at 
her as she drove past him in her car with her car window rolled partly down (R. 397-
403, 421-423, 450, 486, 542-543). After officers responded to his wife's complaint 
and found the knife, tiiey decided to arrest defendant (R. 441-454, 480-496). As they 
approached, defendant ran, and then struggled with the officers (R. 454-457, 495-503). 
2
 The evidence and all reasonable inferences are recited in a light most favorable 
to the verdict. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1993) (case cites omitted). 
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After they had arrested and handcuffed him, defendant kicked a deputy sheriff twice, 
once in the leg and once in the groin (R. 455-456, 501-502; cL R. 411-414), 
Additional facts necessary to the disposition of this case will be set forth in 
argument below. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant has not preserved or properly presented the issues he now raises on 
appeal. They are, in any event, without merit. 
1. Since he pled guilty at his first trial, and requested six continuances 
before his second trial (including one on the morning of trial), defendant waived a 
speedy trial. Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of his motion dismiss for lack 
of a speedy trial. However, a defendant's guilty plea waives his or her right to claim a 
violation of a right to a speedy trial. Defendant's guilty plea at his first trial waived 
any speedy trial issue before that date. Where a defendant stipulates to or affirmatively 
requests the continuances that delay a trial, he also waives a speedy trial. Therefore, 
defendant's requests for six continuances before his second trial (including one on the 
morning of trial because he was intoxicated) likewise waived a speedy trial. In any 
event, defendant was not prejudiced, since the six delays he requested arguably 
impaired presentation of the State's case. 
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2. Since defendant has failed to marshal the evidence, this Court should 
decline to consider his insufficiency claim. Even if the merits are considered, the 
evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of assault by a prisoner. Defendant 
argues that it was impossible for him to have kicked Deputy Todd while the deputy had 
his knee in defendant's back. In his marshaling of the evidence in support of his 
conviction for assault by a prisoner, defendant omits any reference to: 1) Deputy 
Todd's testimony that he was not kneeling on defendant's back when defendant kicked 
him, and the demonstration by Deputy Todd of how the assault took place; 2) the 
testimony of defendant's estranged wife; and 3) his own progressive disclosures on 
cross-examination leading to his ultimate admission that he was physically capable of 
kicking Deputy Todd while on the ground. Since he has failed to marshal all of the 
evidence supporting the jury's verdict, this Court should decline to consider his claim. 
In any event, defendant has failed to establish that, viewed in the light most favorable 
to the jury's verdict, the evidence and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn 
from it are so sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. 
3. Since defendant failed to exercise a peremptory challenge against the 
juror he had challenged for cause, he has not preserved for appeal the trial court's 
denial of his challenge for cause. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by 
failing to dismiss a juror for cause or by failing to allow defendant to conduct 
12 
individual voir dire to further inquire into her potential bias. However, defendant has 
failed to preserve this issue for appeal. In order to preserve a jury selection issue on 
appeal, a criminal defendant must exercise a peremptory challenge, if one is available, 
against the juror unsuccessfully challenged for cause. Defendant had four peremptory 
challenges. Because defendant failed to exercise a peremptory challenge against the 
only member he unsuccessfully challenged for cause, he has not preserved this issue for 
appeal. In any event, this challenged member's responses to defendant's questions 
established no basis to challenge her for cause. 
4. Since defendant failed to move to recuse the judge at trial and failed to 
preserve any basis for recusal, he has waived an recusal issue on appeal. 
Defendant argues that the judge at his second trial erred by not recusing himself from 
presiding over the case when defendant had moved to recuse this same judge from 
presiding at his preliminary hearing. However, defendant failed to preserve any basis 
for recusal at his preliminary hearing because he did not properly present the issue to 
the trial court. Likewise, he failed to move to recuse the judge at trial. He has 
therefore waived any recusal issue on appeal. 
5. Since he failed to properly object to the prosecutor's cross-examination 
at trial, and has failed to assert plain error or exceptional circumstances on 
appeal, defendant has failed to establish a basis for this Court's review. Defendant 
argues that it was improper for the prosecutor to ask defendant about how many times 
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he had been convicted of assault, since the prosecutor did not offer evidence of any 
prior conviction to support his question and thereby called to the jurors' attention a 
matter they would not be justified in considering in reaching a verdict. Defendant also 
argues that the prosecutor improperly asked defendant to comment on the veracity of 
another witness. Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in not sua sponte 
giving curative or limiting instructions on both occasions to prevent prejudice to 
defendant. 
Defendant's objections failed to preserve for appeal the basis on which he now 
challenges the prosecutor's questions. Since he has failed to assert plain error or 
exceptional circumstances in regard to either question, defendant has failed to establish 
a basis for this Court's review. Finally, defendant did not ask for a curative or limiting 
instruction, and he has failed to establish that, had such an instruction been given, there 
is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result. Indeed, he had no objection to 




SINCE HE PLED GUILTY AT HIS FIRST TRIAL, AND 
REQUESTED SIX CONTINUANCES BEFORE HIS SECOND 
TRIAL (INCLUDING ONE ON THE MORNING OF TRIAL), 
DEFENDANT WAIVED A SPEEDY TRIAL 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to grant his rule 25, Utah 
R. Crim. P., motion to dismiss made on grounds of an "unreasonable or 
unconstitutional delay" on the first day of his second trial (Def. Br. at 5-8). Defendant 
argues that he was incarcerated for 77 days before his original trial date (Def. Br. at 
6)3, and that a total of 685 days elapsed from the time of his arrest until his second trial 
(Def. Br. at 5).4 However, defendant's guilty plea waived any speedy trial claim 
before that plea was taken. Defendant waived his right to a speedy trial before his 
second trial by moving to withdraw his guilty plea, and requesting a total of six 
continuances (including one on the morning of trial). Nevertheless, because the trial 
court entertained his motion to dismiss, defendant has preserved this issue for appeal 
(see R. 356-360, addendum B). See State v. Seale. 853 P.2d 862, 870 (Utah) (finding 
that if trial court addresses issue in post-trial motion rather than finding it waived, right 
to assert issue on appeal is resuscitated), cert.denied. 114 S. Ct. 186 (1993). 
3
 From June 7, 1994 until August 22, 1994 is actually 76 days. 
4
 From June 7, 1994 until April 30, 1996 is actually 692 days. 
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The right to a speedy trial is protected by the federal and state constitutions, and 
by state statute. See U.S. Constitution, amend. VI; Utah Constitution, Art. I, §12; 
Utah Code Ann. §77-l-6(l)(f) (1980).5 However, it differs from other constitutionally-
protected rights because "deprivation of the right may work to the accused's advantage. 
[Indeed], delay is not an uncommon defense tactic. . . . Thus, unlike the right to 
counsel or die right to be free from compelled self-mcrimination, deprivation of the 
right to speedy trial does not per se prejudice the accused's ability to defend himself." 
State v. Trafnv. 799 P.2d 704, 706 (Utah 1990) (guoiing Barker v. Wingo. 92 S.Ct. 
2182, 2187 (1972)). 
In reviewing whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated, this 
Court examines four factors: 1) the length of the delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 
3) whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial; and 4) whether defendant 
was prejudiced as a result. State v. Levy a. 906 P.2d 910 (Utah App. 1995) (citing 
State v. Banks. 720 P.2d 1380, 1385 (Utah 1986)); S££ also. Barker v. Wingo. 92 S.Ct. 
2182 (1972). The threshold question is whether a speedy trial issue has been 
preserved. 
A. Defendant's guilty plea at his first trial waived anv speedy trial issue before 
that date. A defendant's guilty plea waives his or her right to claim a violation of a 
5
 The sixth amendment right to a speedy trial was made applicable to the states 
through the fourteenth amendment in Klopfer v. North Carolina. 87 S.Ct. 988 (1967). 
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right to a speedy trial. State v. Brocksmith. 888 P.2d 703, 706 (Utah App. 1994) 
(Citing Tollett v. Henderson. 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1608 (1973) ("When a criminal defendant 
has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which 
he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation 
of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea")). Therefore, 
defendant's guilty plea on August 22, 1994 waived his right to claim a speedy trial 
violation before that date.6 
B. Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and his requests for six 
continuances waived a speedy trial before his second trial. A review of the four Barker 
factors demonstrates that defendant's speedy trial right was not violated. 
6
 Even absent waiver, defendant's claim fails. There were 76 days from his 
arrest to his first trial (from June 7 to August 22, 1994; R. 9-13, 39-40). Defendant 
stipulated to a 22-day delay to resolve his motion to recuse the judge at his first 
scheduled preliminary hearing (from June 22 to July 15, 1994; R. 20, 287-290, 
addendum A). State v. Trafny. 799 P.2d 704, 707 (Utah 1990) ("When a defendant's 
motion is pending before the court, the period of delay consequent to the filing of the 
motion should not be assessed against the State") (citing United States v. Loud Hawk. 
106 S.Ct. 648 (1986)). After subtracting defendant's delay, a total of 54 days (or, less 
than two months) to calendar a trial is not an "unreasonable or unconstitutional delay." 
Utah R. Crim. P. 25(b)(1). See State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325, 1327 (Utah 1986) (53 
days to schedule first trial and 51 days to schedule second "necessary in a jurisdiction 
such as this and not at all unreasonable"). Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has found 
no violation of a defendant's right to a speedy trial where the time between arrest and 
trial was 3Vi months (State v. Knill. 656 P.2d 1026, 1029 (Utah 1982)), AVi months 
(State v. Menzies. 601 P.2d 925, 926 (Utah 1979)), 7 months (State v. Banks. 720 
P.2d 1380, 1385 (Utah 1986)), or even AVz years (State v. Ossana. 739 P.2d 628, 632 
(Utah 1987)). 
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1. Length of delay. The total length of time between defendant's arrest and his 
guilty plea was 76 days (from June 7 until August 22, 1994). The total length of time 
between defendant's guilty plea and his second trial was 616 days (from August 22, 
1994 until April 30, 1996). 
2. Reason for delay. At least 650 of the 692 total days between defendant's 
arrest and his second trial are attributable to defendant or to the normal process of court 
scheduling, leaving a maximum of 42 days even arguably attributable to me State. 
However, these 42 days were time the State needed to adequately respond to 
defendant's motion to withdraw his plea (s££ R. 61, 65-66). "When a defendant's 
motion is pending before the court, the period of delay consequent to the filing of the 
motion should not be assessed against the State." State v. Trafny. 799 P.2d 704, 707 
(Utah 1990) (citing United States v. Loud Hawk. 106 S.Ct. 648 (1986)). In any event, 
"[a] 42-day delay does not rise to the level of per se prejudice nor is it presumptively 
prejudicial." LLat706. 
Where a defendant stipulates to or affirmatively requests the continuances that 
delay a trial, he waives a speedy trial. State v. Lairby. 699 P.2d 1187, 1193 (Utah 
1984);7 s££ also. State v. Ossana. 739 P.2d 628, 631 (Utah 1987) (when a defendant 
7
 In State v. Ossana. 739 P.2d 628, 631 n.8 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme 
Court clarified that the holding in Lairby did not require a defendant to demand his 
right to a speedy trial or forever waive it. However, the Court left intact its holding 
that a defendant who affirmatively acts to delay his trial waives a speedy trial. 
18 
"acts to delay trial, he indicates his willingness to temporarily waive his right to a 
speedy trial. . . . whether or not the reason for the delay is meritorious") (citations 
omitted). By moving to withdraw his guilty plea, and requesting six continuances 
(including one on the morning of his second trial), defendant waived a speedy trial. Te 
reasons for his delays will be explored in more detail. 
On September 21, 1994 defendant submitted a letter to the trial court requesting 
permission to withdraw his guilty plea (R. 44-48). Defendant's motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea was pending until the trial court granted it on December 5, 1994 (R. 96). 
See Trafny. 799 P.2d at 707. In the meantime, defendant was not present at a 
September 26, 1994 hearing, and his defense counsel asked for his first continuance (R. 
49, addendum B). 
When defendant failed to appear at the hearing reset for October 11, 1994, 
defense counsel asked for a second continuance (R. 57, addendum B). 
Defendant was present at the hearing reset for October 24, 1994, and, although 
both parties presented argument relative to defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, an 
evidentiary hearing was set for November 7, 1994 (R. 61, addendum B). 
On November 5, 1995, two days before the scheduled hearing, defendant filed a 
26-page memorandum in support of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea (R. 67-93). 
At the hearing, the State asked for more time to respond to defendant's memorandum 
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(R. 65, addendum B). The hearing was continued from November 7 until December 
5, 1994 (R. 66). Sfifi Trafnv. 799 P.2d at 707. 
On December 5, 1994, the trial court granted defendant's motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea, and set defendant's second trial for March 21 and 22, 1995 (R. 96-98). 
Without a motion or objection from either side appearing in the record, the trial court 
reset defendant's trial twice more, ultimately for May 25 and 26, 1995 (R. 99-102). 
Defendant was not present at a status hearing on May 19, 1995 and his counsel 
requested a third continuance (R. 103, addendum B). The trial was rescheduled for 
August 2 and 3, 1995 (R. 106-107). 
On July 31, 1995 defendant filed a motion for a fourth continuance, asserting 
that he was hospitalized and requesting that the trial be continued until he had 
"recovered from [his] injuries" (R. I l l , addendum B). The trial was rescheduled for 
January 18 and 19, 1996 (R. 115-116). 
On January 17, 1996 defendant filed a motion for & fifth continuance, asserting 
that his flight from Las Vegas, Nevada to Salt Lake City, Utah had been canceled 
because of weather (R. 117-124, addendum B). After a hearing on the motion, the 
trial court granted the continuance and ordered a new trial date "[t]o be set as soon as 
possible" (R. 126). The trial was rescheduled for April 30 and May 1, 1996 (R. 127-
128). 
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Finally, on the morning of April 30, 1996, the first day of defendant's second 
trial, defendant's counsel reported that defendant was drunk, and requested a sixth 
continuance (R. 304-306, addendum B). Defendant's counsel asked that the jury be 
released so defendant could sober up overnight to begin trial the next day. LL The 
prosecutor objected, arguing that the trial had already been continued several times 
because of defendant's condition (R. 304, 307, addendum B). The trial court 
ultimately directed counsel to switch tables so defendant would be seated as far away 
from the jury as possible during jury selection so they would be less likely to observe 
his condition (R. 308-309, addendum B). The trial court also ordered defendant 
incarcerated overnight, with defense counsel's concurrence, to ensure that he would be 
sober for trial the next day (R. 305-306; 125, addendum B). 
3. Defendant's assertion of his right to speedy trial. It was 692 days after his 
arrest, and only after the jury for his second trial was selected, sworn, instructed, and 
excused for the day, that defendant first raised his rule 25, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, motion to dismiss based on an "unreasonable or unconstitutional" delay in 
bringing the case to trial (R. 129-130, 354-355, addendum B). The State opposed the 
motion (R. 355-356, addendum B). The trial court reviewed the chronology of the 
case on the record, and denied the motion (R. 356-360, addendum B).8 
8
 Defendant's assertion that, "from the beginning [he] requested a speedy trial" 
(Def. Br. at 7) is unsupported in the record. In fact, defendant stipulated to a delay 
before his first trial, and requested a total of six delays before his second trial, acts 
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4. Prejudice to defendant by delay. Defendant was not prejudiced. In Barker, 
the Court identified three interests to be protected by limiting pretrial delays: 
1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; 2) minimizing anxiety and concern of 
the accused; and 3) limiting the possibility that the defense would be impaired. Barker. 
92S.Q. at 2193. 
In defendant's case, there was no oppressive pretrial incarceration. Defendant 
was incarcerated for a total of 76 days until the date of his guilty plea (R. 9-13; 40). 
As noted, defendant stipulated to a 22-day delay, while he was incarcerated, pending 
resolution of his motion to recuse the judge (R. 20, 287-290, addendum A). After his 
guilty plea, defendant was at liberty for a total of 616 days until the first day of his 
second trial, when he was incarcerated, with his counsel's concurrence, to ensure that 
he would be sober on the second day of trial (R. 125, 129-130, 304-309). Therefore, 
instead of unreasonably restricting his freedom, defendant's delays prolonged it. See 
Qssana, 739P.2dat631. 
Any anxiety or concern created by defendant's delays was largely self-inflicted. 
Defendant stipulated to a delay before his first trial and requested six delays between 
his first and second trials. Indeed, defendant's lack of anxiety or concern was manifest 
by his conduct: he failed to appear for a hearing on October 11, 1994, with no 
inconsistent with the assertion of speedy trial rights. 
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explanation (R. 57), was in Las Vegas the day before the scheduled start of his second 
trial (R. 117-124), and did not demand his right to a speedy trial until 692 days had 
passed following his arrest. Sfi£ Ossana. 739 P.2d at 631-632. 
Finally, the presentation of defendant's case was not impaired by the delay. 
Defendant was the only defense witness to testify. Thus, he did not have to rely on the 
memories of other witnesses to present his case. Nevertheless, he focused his defense 
on trying to exploit the memories of the State's witnesses, and discrepancies between 
their trial testimony and prior statements (see, £4U, 421-422, 460-461, 465, 468-470, 
511-515, 518, 521-525). Therefore, it was arguably the State's case that was 
prejudiced by defendant's delays. See Ossana. 739 P.2d at 632. 
In sum, defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated and he has suffered 
no prejudice. Indeed, by his actions defendant demonstrated that he did not want a 
speedy trial. See Ossana, 739 P.2d at 632; Barker, 92 S.Ct. at 2194. 
Point II 
SINCE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE, THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER 
HIS INSUFFICIENCY CLAIM; EVEN IF THE MERITS ARE 
CONSIDERED, THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICD2NT TO 
CONVICT DEFENDANT OF ASSAULT BY A PRISONER 
Defendant was convicted of assault by a prisoner for kicking a deputy sheriff in 
the leg and in the groin (R. 164; 455-456, 501-502). Defendant now argues that the 
evidence was insufficient to convict him of assault by a prisoner (Def. Br. at 8-10). He 
23 
focuses his argument on purported conflicts in the testimony of two sheriffs deputies, 
and his own testimony that it would have been impossible to kick Deputy Todd if the 
deputy was kneeling on defendant's back (Def. Br. at 9-10). However, in his 
marshaling of the evidence defendant omits any reference to: 1) Deputy Todd's 
testimony that he was not kneeling on defendant's back when defendant kicked him, 
and the demonstration by Deputy Todd of how the assault took place; 2) the testimony 
of defendant's estranged wife; and 3) Ms own progressive disclosures on cross-
examination leading to his ultimate admission that he was physically capable of kicking 
Deputy Todd while on the ground. 
"When challenging a jury verdict, a defendant must marshal all the evidence 
supporting that verdict and then demonstrate why that evidence is insufficient to support 
the conviction." Farrow. 919 P.2d at 53 n.l (citation omitted). When a defendant fails 
to meet this marshaling burden, this Court will decline to consider an insufficiency 
claim. I$L Since defendant has failed to meet his marshaling burden, this Court should 
decline to consider his claim. 
In his page-long recitation of the facts (Def. Br. at 9), defendant omits any 
reference to Deputy Todd's testimony that, "because [defendant's] feet were not 
restrained at that time, he rolled his body to his left side and with his right leg kicked 
me" (R. 502). 
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Defendant also ignores the demonstration by Deputy Todd, during cross-
examination, of how the assault took place (R. 522-525). Both before and after the 
demonstration, Deputy Todd explained that he did not have his knee on defendant's 
back at the time defendant kicked him, but had left himself vulnerable which was why 
he was kicked. He changed his position and put his knee on defendant's back after 
defendant kicked him in the leg and groin (R. 520, 525). Deputy Todd himself 
volunteered that "it would have been impossible for [defendant] to kick me in the groin 
[while my knee was on his back]" (R. 520). 
Defendant also omits any reference to his estranged wife's testimony about the 
incident (R. 411-414). She testified that, after the officers arrested defendant and 
allowed him to stand, she saw defendant "kicking at the officers" (R. 412). When they 
took him down to the ground again, she testified that, while she did not watch the entire 
episode, she saw that defendant "was still flailing his legs around trying to kick the 
officers" and, at that point, a couple of the officers went to get some leg restraints (R. 
413). 
Finally, defendant omits any reference to his own progressive disclosures on 
cross-examination and ultimate admission about his ability to kick while on the ground 
(R. 552-557). During direct examination, defendant had testified it would have been 
physically impossible for him to kick someone while on the ground (R. 551; cL R. 
580-584). On cross-examination he initially denied ever kicking at anybody during the 
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entire incident (R. 553-554). When confronted with his wife's testimony, he later 
conceded that he had kicked gravel at the officers when they had let him stand (R. 554-
555), and he finally agreed that if he were laid on the floor he would be able to move 
his feet in a kicking motion: "I'm sure I could" (R. 557). 
In sum, in his minimal recitation of the facts, defendant "merely reargue[d] the 
evidence most favorable to him, leaving it to this court to sort out what evidence 
actually supports the jury's verdict." York v. Shulsen. 875 P.2d 590, 598 (Utah 
App.), cerUented, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994); SSS, alSQ Alta Indus. Ltd. V. Hurst. 
846 P.2d 1282, 1287 (Utah 1993) ("Although [appellant] cites some evidence that 
supports the court's findings, even a cursory review of the record reveals [appellant] 
frequently omits crucial and incriminating evidence and cites testimony . . . without 
reference to conflicting testimony. . . . " ) . Therefore, defendant has failed to meet his 
marshaling burden, and this Court should decline to consider his insufficiency claim. 
Farrow. 919 P.2d at 53 n. 1. 
Assuming, arguendo, this Court decides to consider the merits of defendant's 
claim, he has failed to establish that, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, the evidence and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from it are so 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. £fi£ Hamilton. 827 P.2d at 235. 
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Three eyewitnesses testified that defendant was trying to kick the arresting 
officers (R. 411-414, 455-456, 501-502). Two eyewitnesses testified that defendant 
kicked one of the deputies twice (R. 455-456, 501-502). Nevertheless, defendant flatly 
denied that he kicked anyone (R. 570), and tried to use Deputy Todd's preliminary 
hearing testimony to impeach the two deputies (R. 460-461, 465, 468-470, 511-515, 
518, 521-525). The Utah Supreme Court has written: 
When the evidence presented is conflicting or disputed, the jury serves as 
the exclusive judge of both the credibility of witnesses and the weight to 
be given particular evidence. [Citations omitted] Ordinarily, a reviewing 
court may not reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence, but must 
resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor of the jury verdict. [Citation 
omitted] 
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). The supreme court concluded that 
in "some unusual circumstancesn a reviewing court may reassess witness credibility, 
such as where there is "either a physical impossibility of the evidence being true, or its 
falsity must be apparent, without any resort to inferences or deductions." IiL (citations 
omitted). Since such unusual circumstances do not exist in this case, the jury's 
credibility determinations should not be disturbed. 
In sum, defendant has failed to establish that, viewed in the light most favorable 
to the jury's verdict, the evidence and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn 
from it are so sufficientlv inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
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must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. See Hamilton. 827 P.2d at 
235. 
Point m 
SINCE DEFENDANT FAILED TO EXERCISE A PEREMPTORY 
CHALLENGE AGAINST THE JUROR HE HAD CHALLENGED 
FOR CAUSE, HE HAS NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF HIS CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss a juror for cause 
or by failing to allow defendant to conduct individual voir dire to further inquire into 
her potential bias (Def. Br. at 10-11). However, defendant has failed to preserve this 
issue for appeal. 
During voir dire, in response to the trial court's questions, a Mrs. Budge 
indicated that she was married to a police officer, that one of the witnesses scheduled to 
testify worked with her husband, and that she knew one of the attorneys involved in 
defendant's case (although she did not identify which one) (R. 318-320). She explained 
that, while she had met them, neither the witness nor the attorney were what she would 
characterize as friends, and she did not socialize with them. IsL. She indicated that she 
thought she would not be influenced by her acquaintance with one of the witnesses, and 
that she could render a decision based solely on the evidence. Id. 
Defendant challenged Mrs. Budge for cause, arguing that she was married to a 
police officer and that three of the counts turned on whether to believe the police 
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officers' testimony or defendant's testimony (R. 326). The trial court denied 
I 
defendant's request for individual voir dire, and denied his challenge for cause (R. 326-
329). Thereafter, during his voir dire of all potential jurors, defense counsel asked, 
"Would any of you believe a sheriffs deputy or a police officer's testimony more than 
just a layperson's testimony? Are you willing to give it the same weight, I guess, is my 
question?" (R. 336). Although two other jurors responded that they might give more 
credence to a police officer's testimony, Mrs. Budge did not (R. 336-337). 
The trial court granted defendant's challenge for cause against another juror (R. 
331-332), and defendant exercised his four peremptory challenges, but did not remove 
Mrs. Budge (R. 131, addendum C). 
In State v. Baker. 935 P.2d 503, 510 (Utah 1997) (plurality opinion), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that, "in order to preserve the error on appeal, a criminal 
defendant must exercise a peremptory challenge, if one is available, against the juror 
unsuccessfully challenged for cause." Defendant had four peremptory challenges. 
Mrs. Budge was the only member defendant had unsuccessfully challenged for cause. 
Because defendant failed to exercise a peremptory challenge against her, he has not 
preserved this issue for appeal. 
29 
Point IV 
SINCE DEFENDANT FAILED TO MOVE TO RECUSE THE 
JUDGE AT TRIAL AND FAILED TO PRESERVE ANY BASIS FOR 
RECUSAL, HE HAS WAIVED ANY RECUSAL ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Defendant argues that the judge at his second trial erred by not sua sponte 
recusing himself from presiding over the case after defendant had moved to recuse this 
same judge from presiding at his preliminary hearing (Def. Br. at 11-12). However, 
defendant failed to preserve any basis for recusal at his preliminary hearing because he 
did not properly present the issue to the trial court. Likewise, he failed to move to 
recuse the judge at trial. He has therefore waived any recusal issue on appeal. 
Because it was not properly presented, the basis for challenging the judge at 
defendant's June 22, 1994 preliminary hearing was not preserved. Defendant made an 
oral motion to recuse Judge Clint S. Judkins from presiding at his preliminary hearing 
on the grounds that he had revoked defendant's probation in another case (R. 20, 287-
290, addendum A). Although Judge Judkins ordered defendant to make his motion in 
writing, and although a written affidavit in support of such a motion and a certificate 
that it is made in good faith are required by procedural rules, no written motion, 
affidavit, or certificate appear in the record (R. 290; Utah R. Crim. P. 29(c) and (d), 
Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b)). Because he did not properly preserve this issue below, 
defendant is barred from raising it now. LL (S££ al££ Utah R. Crim. P. 12); State v. 
Irwin. 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah App. 1996) ("It is a well-established rule that a defendant 
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who fails to bring an issue before the trial court is generally barred from raising it for 
the first time on appeal") (citations omitted). 
By failing to move to recuse Judge Judkins from presiding at his second trial, 
defendant likewise waived any recusal issue on appeal. The Utah Supreme Court has 
written, "To be timely, a motion to disqualify [a judge] should be filed at counsel's first 
opportunity after learning of the disqualifying facts." Madsenv. Prudential Fed. Sav. 
& Loan. 767 P.2d 538, 543 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted). As noted, defendant made 
an oral motion to recuse at his June 22, 1994 preliminary hearing (R. 20, 287-290, 
addendum A).9 In early November 1995, defendant's counsel had notice that Judge 
Judkins had been assigned to preside at defendant's second trial (R. 115-116). 
Although defendant thereafter filed a motion requesting a continuance (R. 117-124), 
and his counsel appeared at a hearing on the motion before Judge Judkins (R. 126), 
defendant made no motion to recuse the judge. In early February 1996 defendant's 
counsel had notice that Judge Judkins was assigned to preside at defendant's continued 
trial (R. 127-128). Nevertheless, defendant again made no motion to recuse him. 
9
 Ultimately, a judge other than Judge Judkins presided at defendant's 
preliminary hearing (R. 24-27, 198), arraignment (R. 32), bail reduction hearing (R. 
64), and his first trial (R. 39-40), and at the hearings on his motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea leading up to his second trial (R. 49, 57, 61-62, 65, 96, 103). Likewise, a 
different judge acted on defendant's first written motion to continue his second trial (R. 
114). After that continuance was granted, defendant's trial was set before Judge 
Judkins (R. 115-116). Judge Judkins granted defendant's motion to continue the trial 
(R. 126-128) and presided at defendant's second trial (R. 129-130, 369, 473). 
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Although Judge Judkins presided at defendant's April 30 and May 1, 1996 trial (R. 
129-130, 369, 473), defendant made no motion to recuse him at trial. Defendant 
likewise made no motion for a new trial because Judge Judkins had presided at his trial. 
See Utah R. Crim. P. 24. It was not until he submitted his brief on May 29, 1997 that 
defendant first argued that Judge Judkins should have recused himself from presiding at 
his second trial (Def. Br. at 11-12). 
In State v. Alonzo-Nolasco. 932 P.2d 606, 609 (Utah App. 1997), this Court 
noted that "a judge should recuse himself [or herself] when his [or her] * impartiality' 
might reasonably be questioned." (Quoting State v. Neeley. 748 P.2d 1091, 1094 
(Utah), cert.denied. 108 S.Ct. 2876 (1988)). However, "absent a showing of actual 
bias or an abuse of discretion, failure to recuse does not constitute reversible error as 
long as the requirements of [rule 29, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure] are met." IsL 
at 610 (iflioting Neeley. 748 P.2d at 1094-1095) (emphasis added). By failing to 
properly submit the matter to the trial court in compliance with rule 29, defendant 
precluded Judge Judkins from complying with the requirements of that rule. Therefore, 
he has not preserved a basis to challenge Judge Judkins and has waived this issue. 
In any event, failure of a trial judge to recuse himself or herself even where he 
or she should have, based on the appearance of possible bias or prejudice, does not 
require reversal unless a defendant establishes "actual prejudice," meaning, if another 
judge had presided there would have been "a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
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result for the defendant." Alonzo. 932 P.2d at 611 (citations omitted). Defendant 
makes two conclusory statements in support of prejudice: 1) that he was prejudiced 
because Judge Judkins would not allow a one-day continuance so that defendant would 
be sober when the jury was selected, and 2) that Judge Judkins denied his challenge for 
cause against Mrs. Budge (Def. Br. at 12). Although he asserts that he was prejudiced 
by these two rulings, defendant fails to assert how he was prejudiced. In other words, 
he has failed to assert or establish actual prejudice. 
First, defendant does not even assert that a different judge would have granted 
his request for a continuance on the morning of trial, or his challenge for cause against 
Mrs. Budge. 
Second, although jury selection went forward in spite of his intoxication, 
defendant has failed even to assert that his ability to assist his counsel during voir dire 
was in any way impaired. 
Third, as for his voluntary intoxication during jury selection unfavorably 
influencing the jury against him: ironically, the only charge of which defendant was 
acquitted was intoxication (R. 164). 
Fourth, as discussed under Point HI above, defendant waived his challenge for 
cause against Mrs. Budge, and, in any event, his own questions and her response 
established no basis to challenge her for cause (see R. 336-337). 
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Finally, defendant has only challenged his conviction under one charge (see 
Point II, above). This was not a bench trial. Defendant has not asserted, let alone 
established, that, but for a different judge, the jury would have acquitted him of assault 
by a prisoner. Therefore, even if the recusal issue was not waived, defendant has 
failed to establish actual prejudice. 
Point V 
SINCE HE FAILED TO PROPERLY OBJECT TO THE 
PROSECUTOR'S CROSS-EXAMINATION AT TRIAL, AND HAS 
FAILED TO ASSERT PLAIN ERROR OR EXCEPTIONAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES ON APPEAL, DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO 
ESTABLISH A BASIS FOR THIS COURT'S REVTEW 
Defendant argues that it was improper for the prosecutor to ask defendant about 
how many times he had been convicted of assault, since the prosecutor did not offer 
evidence of any prior conviction to support his question and thereby called to the 
jurors' attention a matter they would not be justified in considering in reaching a 
verdict (Def. Br. at 12-13). Defendant also argues that the prosecutor improperly 
asked defendant to comment on the veracity of another witness (Def. Br. at 14). 
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in not sua sponte giving curative or 
limiting instructions on both occasions to prevent prejudice to defendant (Def. Br. at 
13, 14). 
Defendant's objections failed to preserve for appeal the basis on which he now 
challenges the prosecutor's questions. Since he has failed to assert or argue plain error 
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or exceptional circumstances in regard to either question, defendant has failed to 
establish a basis for this Court's review. Finally, defendant did not ask for a curative 
or limiting instruction, and he has failed to establish that, had such an instruction been 
given, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result. Indeed, he had no 
objection to the final instructions given by the judge (R. 616). 
A. Question About Assault Convictions. The following excerpts from the 
record provide context for the prosecutor's question and defendant's objection. 
During direct examination, defendant testified that "each time that [the police 
have] been at my nouse they either tried or were successful in seriously injuring me" 
(R. 546). He also testified that he was "upset that they were there at all" the night of 
this incident (R. 546; cL R. 548), and that he "had continually told the officers that I 
thought they were trespassing, I don't think they needed to be there. If they wanted to 
be there they could go secure a warrant" (R. 547). During cross-examination, the 
following exchanges occurred: 
Q. You indicated that you were really angry at the officers for coming 
to your home because they were trespassing. Are they trespassing if your 
wife invites them to come? 
A. Not necessarily. On one hand, yes, and on one hand no. 
Q. If your wife has a complaint against you and calls the police, are 
you suggesting that they're not entitled to come? 
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A. There was not a crime in progress. They could come out and 
investigate and that was as fas [sic] as they had to go. 
(R. 558) 
Q. The officers showed up so you retreated to your little apartment 
and started drinking, is that what you're telling us? 
A. Not exactly, but I guess it ended up that way. Their presence did 
make me very nervous. 
(R. 568) 
Q. . . . [Y]ou weren't in a proper state of mind? 
A. I obviously wasn't in a good state of mind. I was awfully pissed 
that they'd come out on the propeity and beat me up again. As far as I'm 
concerned, that's what they did. Then they're lying and saying I kicked 
somebody. I didn't kick anybody. 
Q. Your view of when the officers come is for them just to come out 
and beat you up? 
A. That's what they've done. 
Q. The reason would never have been that your wife asked them to 
come out and assist her, it's always to come out and beat you up, is that 
what you're saying? 
A. I'm saying that's proven totally accurate. 
Q. So you wouldn't disagree with that statement? 
A. (Witness nodded his head.) 
Q. In fact, your wife doesn't need any help, she never needs any help? 
A. As a matter of fact, no. As a matter of fact, -
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Q. And when you're screaming on the phone that she's doing things 
with all these cops, that's true from your perspective? 
A. When you're the one on the shop floor being beat up with a 
baseball bat, come back and ask me that question again, 
Q. You're saying that somebody beat you up with a baseball bat? 
A. Yes. You have suggested that I'm a spouse beater. In fact, you 
have that exactly backwards. At first I let her hit me. But later on it 
didn't turn out that way. When I called the police to try to put an end to 
that, they came out and arrested me. There I am covered with bruises 
from head to toe. She tells the police, well, he bruises at the slightest tap. 
Not one of these police officers is smart enough to ask what she was 
doing tapping me all over my body. Yes, I'd say it has worked that way. 
Q. So she's the one that is at fault and you're the one that always gets 
beat up by the cops and gets arrested? 
A. Eventually, yes. I can't suggest that's happened a whole lot, but it 
has happened. 
Q. Are you suggesting that you have never assaulted her? You never 
gave the officers a basis to arrest you? 
A. Define that. Have I ever hit her back? Yes. As far as they're 
concerned, women don't assault men. I'm automatically at fault. 
Q. You never hit her except when she hits you first? 
A. That's the truth. 
Q. That's what you're telling us? 
A, That is the absolute truth. 
Q. But you keep getting arrested and that's one of the reasons why it 
makes you mad? 
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MR. PERRY: Your Honor, Til have to object at this point. I think the 
cross is exceeding the scope of direct examination. 
THE COURT: No, I don't think so. I think he can respond to the 
question. 
THE WITNESS: I never said I keep getting arrested. I tried to explain 
that. I said it has happened. 
Q. (By MR. WYATT) How many times have you been convicted of this 
charge? 
MR. PERRY: Objection, Your Honor. 
THE WITNESS: Which charge? 
THE COURT: What's your objection? 
MR. PERRY: I think he's delving into past history to try and impeach 
him and I object at this point. 
THE COURT: I'm sorry. I can't understand you, Mr. Perry. 
MR. PERRY: He's asking him questions at this time in an attempt to 
impeach the witness as far as prior sentences. 
THE COURT: Let's have counsel approach the bench. 
(Discussion at the bench.) 
A. (BY MR. WYATT) I think we've explored that area enough. I'm 
going to go on. . . . 
(R. 570-573). 
Defendant's objection of record did not preserve the issue of prosecutorial 
misconduct for lack of an evidentiary basis to ask the question. As this Court recently 
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noted, "'[A] contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation of 
claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record before an appellate court 
will review such claims on appeal/ Importantly, the grounds for the objection must be 
distinctly and specifically stated." State v. Winward, No. 960274-CA, slip op. at 10 
(Utah App. June 12, 1997) (fluating State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 
1989) (Quoting State V, Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987))); SS£ alSQ Utah R. 
Evid. 103. Because defendant failed to specifically object on the grounds he now 
claims on appeal, he has failed to preserve those grounds for appellate review. 
Absent such a specific objection at trial, a defendant must assert plain error or 
exceptional circumstance or this Court likewise has no basis for review. £fi£ State v. 
Irwin. 924 P.2d 5, 7-8, 12 (Utah App. 1996). Because defendant has failed to assert 
either on appeal, he has failed to provide a basis for this Court's review. IsL 
It should nevertheless be noted that, in context, it appears the prosecutor was 
attempting to use defendant's lack of any prior assault conviction to impeach him. See 
State v. Tucker. 800 P.2d 819 (Utah App. 1990). Although defendant had been 
convicted in another case of violating a protective order, and had previously been 
charged with two counts of misdemeanor assault, there is no record that he had been 
convicted of assault before his conviction in this case (R. 10-12). Therefore, any 
implication from his unanswered question that defendant had a prior conviction for 
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assault resulted from defendant's own objection, since, based on the record, 
defendant's honest answer would have been: "zero" (R. 10-12). 
Likewise, even if the issue were preserved, the prosecutor's question was open-
ended, never answered, and withdrawn. Therefore, defendant's failure to ask for a 
limiting or curative instruction (R. 616) is understandable since there was nothing to 
limit or cure. See Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c); State v. Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107, 1108-
1109 (Utah 1996) ("we have been very reluctant to review jury instructions and other 
matters not preserved for appeal by means of an objection at trial") (citations omitted). 
In the final analysis, defendant's conviction for the assault on his wife was 
based, not on an unanswered question, but on his judicial admissions (see again R. 539, 
542-543, 544-545, 546, 558-560). Defendant has not preserved the issue of 
prosecutorial misconduct, and, in any event, cannot establish the reasonable likelihood 
of a more favorable result had the prosecutor not asked this question. State v. Tennev. 
913 P.2d 750 (Utah App. 1996). 
B. Question About Kicking At Officers. Defendant complains about another 
exchange during cross-examination (Def. Br. at 14). He asserts that the prosecutor 
improperly asked defendant to comment on the veracity of his wife's testimony. LL 
The questions and answers quoted by defendant will be put in context below: 
Q. So what you're saying is you didn't swing your legs at all? 
A. I was squirming, but I wasn't kicking at anything. 
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Q. Did you hear Linda [defendant's wife] testify that she saw you 
kicking at them? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You're saying that's false? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you try to kick at somebody? 
A. No. 
Q. When she said you were trying to kick at somebody that's not 
false, isn't that what you just told me? 
A. She saw what looked like me trying to kick at them. Actually, I 
kicked gravel at them. That's in the standing upright position. 
Q. So what you thought you were doing was kicking gravel at them? 
A. I don't know what she thought I was doing. She said — 
Q. I'm asking what you thought you were doing? 
A. I know exactly what I was doing. 
MR. PERRY: Objection, Your Honor. He can't testify as to what Linda 
thought. 
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MR. WYATT: I'm not telling him. to tell me what she thought. I'm 
telling him to tell me what he was doing. 
THE COURT: Rephrase your question, Mr. Hangartner, listen to the 
question carefully and then respond to the question. 
Q. (BY MR. WYATT) What were you doing? 
A. I just told you. I kicked rocks. That's a movement of my foot by 
about this far. 
(R. 553-555). 
Defendant's untimely objection failed to preserve the prosecutorial misconduct 
issue, and was itself in error as the context makes clear: the prosecutor was not asking 
defendant what his wife thought. Since he has failed to assert plain error or exceptional 
circumstances, defendant has not provided a basis for this Court's review. Winward. 
No. 960274-CA, slip op. at 10 (citations omitted); Irwin. 924 P.2d at 7-8, 12. 
In any event, aside from baldly asserting that the prosecutor's questions were 
"improper and highly prejudicial," and that the trial court "should have given an 
instruction correcting the errors" (Def. Br. at 14), defendant has not established that, 
absent these questions, or if a limiting or curative instruction had been given, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome. £fi£ State v. Tenney. 913 P.2d 750 




Defendant's convictions should be affirmed. 
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THE COURT: This is th£ case of State of Utah vs. 
3 time set for the preliminary hearing. Mr. Burbank. 
4 are you prepared to proceed1? 
5 MR. BURBANK: Yes, Youf Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Is the defense ready to proceed, Mr. 
7 Perry? 
8 I MR. PERRY: We're ready to proceed, Your Honor. 
9 (However, Mr, Hangartner wanted me to -- if I could 
10 | have a couple of minutes to talk to him. He thought 
I 
11 i we were going to be in front of Judge Harris this 
12 , morning. He has an issue h<* wants to discuss with me 
13 I regarding --
14 THE COURT: Do we need to take a recess or just a 
15 ! discussion at the table t h e f e ? 
16 [ MR. PERRY: I think I petter talk to him back in 
17 ! the cell. 
18 THE COURT: Very well. Let's take a very brief 







( Short recess.) 
THE COURT: Gentlemen, as I understand it, you 
have been involved in some sort of negotiations and if 
it looks like a possibility of working it out I'll 
give you additional time. If not, if we need to try 
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MR. BURBANK: My understanding is that we've made 
a proposal but that has been rejected, so we're 
preparedtoproceed. 
MR- PERRY: That's correct. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Perry. 
MR. PERRY: One motion that Mr. Hangartner asked 
me to make, he says that in February of '92 you 
presided over a hearing, a sentencing hearing, on a 
violation of a protective order. He says at that time 
that Adult Parole and Probation prepared a presentence 
investigation. He says that in the presentence 
investigation it made reference to repeated behavior 
and they were recommending that he receive the maximum 
sentence for that offense. 
At that time I think he was represented by 
Ray Malouf. I think arguments were made that there 
had not been repeated behavior and that Adult Parole 
and Probation had made an incorrect assessment on Mr. 
Hangartner. They argued that at that time. 
He feels like you ignored his argument at 
that time and accepted the recommendation of Adult 
Parole and Probation and sentenced him to the maximum 
at that time. He feels that at that time he was 
treated unfairly. He feels that as a result of that 
incident he cannot possibly get a fair trial in front 
Page 3 0<? 




j court to have a different magistrate preside over the 
preliminary hearing. 
THE COURT: Mr. Burbank. 
5 ! MR. BURBANK: Well, we're prepared to proceed. 
We obviously didn't receive any notice of this motion 
7 |so that we could respond. I also appreciate the rules 
i 
8 ; as pertains to a motion to recuse or disqualify a 
9 I judge . 
10 I guess the defendant needs to understand 
11 that if for some reason this court grants that motion 
12 that he would be sitting in jail until a decision 













prepared to proceed today. 
THE COURT: Mr. Perry, maybe you can explain the 
J consequences of such a motion to Mr. Hangartner. What 
we'll do is I'll require that that motion be made in 
(writing and that a certification, as required by the 
» 
i rules, be submitted as well. Then I'll either -*• I'll 
consider that and either accept or reject it. 
If I recuse myself, we'll have to 
reschedule the matter for another time. If I don't, 
then that matter -- the pleadings are then submitted 
to another judge who considers that and rules on it. 
And then we'll schedule this hearing again. 









Tell me a little bit about your client. 
Is he incarcerated only on this matter? 
MR. PERRY: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: We're talking about a two or three 
week delay here. Does he understand that? 
MR. HANGARTNER: Yes, sir, I understand that. 
MR. PERRY: When we were discussing this I asked 
him if he would waive his right to -- to delay for 
9 ' that purpose. He said he would. 
I 
10 j THE COURT: Very well. We'll stay it and once 
i 
11 the motion has been made then all the matters are 
i 














filed in writing. 
Mr. Burbank, we'll continue this matter. 
I'll notify you, or my clerk will, and we'll clear 
another time as soon as the motion has been disposed 
of. We'll then notify your office and see if we can't 
clear another date. That will be two or three weeks 
at the very least. 
MR. BURBANK: Thank you, Your Honor. 




Cache County, UT, District Court 
Div/Dept: 1 
Judge: Gordon J. Low Date: 09/26/1934 
Bailiff: DOUG Clerk: MAB 
Tape Set No: SEPTEMBER 26, 1994 Case No: 941-108 FS HANGARTNE 
Plaintiff: 













































Defendant not present. 
ATD received faxed from defendant. Defendant 
is hospitalized. 
ATD requested continuance. 
Court granted continuance to October 11. 1994 
at 1:30 pm, will 
authorized a Bench Warrant at the request of 
the State. 
Recording ends... 
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Cache County, UT, District Court 
Div/Dept: 1 
Judge: BEN HADFIELD 
Bailiff: DOUG 
Tape Set No: OCTOBER 11, 1994 
Date: 10/11/1994 
Clerk: MAB 
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Defendant not present. 
ATD stated he had spoken with Defendant a 
week ago. Request 
continuance for two weeks. 
ATP status of hospitalization of the 
Defendant. 
Court will continue standing authorization of 
a no bail bench 
warrant. 
Case continued to October 24, 1994 at 1:30 
pm. 
Recording ends... 
The JAVS AUTO-LOG SYSTEM Page 1 
fcT"1 
Cache County, UTf District Court 
Div/Dept: 1 
Judge: Gordon J. Low 
Bailiff: DENNIS 
Tape Set No: OCTOBER 24, 1994 
Date: 10/24/1994 
Clerk: MAB 
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Plaintiff: 

























































































































Defendant present with counsel. 
ATD would like to address defendant's motion 
to withdraw plea. 
Defendant addressed court. 
Court questioned defendant and counsel. 
ATP addressed court. 
Court. 
ATD responds. 
ATP withdraws stipulation of release. 
ATD & defendant to contact physician-
Brief recess. 
Recording begins.•• 
ATD addressed court. 
ATP request evidentiary hearing be set. 
ATD has complied with all instructions. 
Court met with counsel in chambers. 
Physician called. 
TAPE START! Recording begins.•• 
TAPE STOP! Recording ends... 
TAPE START! Recording begins... 
is, 
to 
Court stated procedurally where case 
motion filed incorrectly. 
ATP will withdraw previous objection 
stipulation of defendant's 
release, provided sentencing is continued 
November 7f 1994 at 
to 
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TAPE START! Recording begins... 
Defendant present with counsel. 
Court reviewed status of case. 
ATP would like time to respond. 
Court stated ATD had brought up some 
important issues. 
Court will continue matter to December 
1994 at 1:30 pm. 
Recording ends... 
5, 
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IK THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTR.JT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
k±*h ^ iJiJK 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
^ TVfenr Defendant 
NOTICE OF SETTING 
CASE NO: <H 1 DOfi 1 0 V 
JUDGE jQ&\dL(T*r\CL- ffJ&u^ 
PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT THE ABOVE-NAMED CASE HAS BEEN SET BEFORE THE FIRST DIS-
TRICT COURT AS FOLLOWS: 
DATE: N^C~ ^ R 5 l{ 
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TIME: ^ 1 -3ft pm 
ADDRESS: CACHE COUNTY HALL OF JUSTICE 
140 NORTH 100 WEST 
LOGAN, UTAH 84321 
PHONE: (801)752-3229 
COPIES OF THIS NOTICE WERE HAND DELIVERED TO PARTIES OR COUNSEL AT THE TIME OF 
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Tape Set No: May 19, 1995 
Date: 05/19/1995 
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TAPE START! Recording begins... 
Case called 
ATD David Perry 
ATP Jim Jenkins 
Status 
ATD 
def in Vets hospital 
motion to continue trial set for May 25 & 26 
ATP 
no opposition to motion 
Court 
document from hospital to be filed with court 
review on June 5th for status 
TAPE STOP! Recording ends... 
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LOGAN D/STRiPi LOGAN DISTRICT U J i ' * . ' C ? 
David M. Perry, #5410 
PERRY, MALMBERG & PERRY 
Attorney for Defendant 
29 West 100 North 
P.O. Box 364 
Logan, UT 84323-0364 
(801) 753-5331 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNT, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT GENE HANGARTNER, ] 
Defendant. 
i AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID M. 
I PERRY 
1 Case NO. 941000108 FS 
1 Judge: Gordon J. Low 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF CACHE ) 
David M. Perry being first duly sworn deposes and says: 
1. I am the court appointed attorney for the 
defendant. 
2. The defendant is currently a patient at the 
Veterans Administration Hospital for injuries sustained last 
week in an incident that occurred at the mouth of Millville 
Canyon. 
3. The defendant has requested that his trial in the 
above-entitled matter be continued until he has recovered 
from the injuries sustained as a result of this assault. 
Case NO.3J31LM 
AUG \ 1995 Jt\* 
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David M. Perry, #5410 
PERRY, MALMBERG & PERRY 
Attorney for Defendant 
14 West 100 North 
P.O. Box 364 
Logan, UT 84323-0364 
(801) 753-5331 
.. ... :OURT 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





! MOTION TO CONTINUE 
i Case No. 941000108 
COMES NOW the defendant, Robert Hangartner, by and 
through his court appointed attorney and hereby requests a 
continuance of his trial scheduled for January 18, 1996. In 
attempting to travel to Salt Lake from Tuscon, Arizona, Mr, 
Hangarter made his 11 a.m. flight to Las Vegas, Nevada, but 
in an attempt to fly from Las Vegas to Salt Lake City the 
flights have been cancelled due to weather conditions. 
lnfk 
DATED this / / day of January, 1996. 
PERRY, MALMBERG & PERRY 
Pv 
It 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a copy of the 
foregoing Motion to Continue to the Cache County 
Prosecutor's Office, 110 North 100 West, on this {/ day 
of January, 1996. 
David M. Perry, #5410 
PERRY, MALMBERG & PERRY 
Attorney for Defendant 
14 West 100 North 
P.O. Box 364 
Logan, UT 84323-0364 
(801) 753-5331 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





i MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO CONTINUE 
Case No. 941000108 
The defendant, Robert Hangartner, by and through his 
court appointed attorney hereby submits the following 
Memorandum in Support of his Motion to Continue. Rule 17(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states that in all 
cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel. The defendant shall be 
personally present at the trial with the following 
exceptions: 
(1) In prosecution of misdemeanors and 
infractions, defendant may consent in writing to trial 
in his absence; (2) In prosecutions for offenses not 
punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence 
from the trial after notice to defendant of the time 
for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried 
and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall have 
the same effect as if defendant had been present; and 
(3) The court may .exclude or excuse a defendant from 
trial for good cause shown which may include 
tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct. 
JAN 17 1W6 "/£, 0^ 
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None of the exceptions to Rule 17 (a) apply in this 
case. The defendant has been residing in Tucson, Arizona, 
and his flight to Salt Lake City was cancelled due to 
weather conditions. The trial cannot proceed without the 
defendant voluntarily being absent. The defendant has no 
control over the airlines and the weather. He has made a 
bona fide good faith effort to appear in court for his 
trial. 
Wherefore, the defendant respectfully requests that the 
trial in the above-entitled matter be continued so that he 
may be in attendance for the trial. 
DATED this / / day of January, 1996. 
PERRY, MALMBERG & PERRY 
(Uk.L -, 
David M. P e r r y 7 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum in Support of Motion to Continue to the 
Cache County Prosecutor's Office, 110 North 100 West, on 
this / / day of January, 1996. 
3 
David M. Perry, #5410 
PERRY, MALMBERG & PERRY 
Attorney for Defendant 
14 West 100 North 
P.O. Box 364 
Logan, UT 84323-0364 
(801) 753-5331 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 






> AFFIDAVIT OF JANA 
1 WATTS 
1 Case No. 941000108 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:SS 
County of Cache ) 
Jana Watts, being first duly sworn deposes and says: 
1. I am a secretary at the law firm of Perry, 
Malmberg & Perry. 
2. I received a phone call from Robert Hangartner 
stating he was in the Las Vegas airport. He stated that his 
flight to Salt Lake had been cancelled due to weather 
conditions. 
3. I called Southwest Airlines to verify the 
information Mr. Hangartner had given me. As a result of the 
phone call, I learned that Southwest Flight No. 1749 from 
Tucson to Las Vegas to Salt Lake City had been rerouted from 
Las Vegas to Seattle had been cancelled due to Salt Lake 
airport not accepting any flights. jg^ j%pt 9*/-/-/()X 
JAM 7 1996 */7 
:7 °3 52 
4. Southwest Airline indicated at 3 p.m. the Salt 
Lake Airport was still not accepting flights due to weather 
conditions. 
DATED this V1^ n day of January, 1996. 
i ft'iUvUVm Jan^ Watts 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 
January, 1996. 
i*4 
I / day of 
My commission expires 
Notary PuElic 
Residing at 
I ^m^ NOTARY PUBVC Z £&h DAVID M PERRY I 
I ro¥3 29 WEST 100 NORTH f 
! *>&>y LOGAN. UT 84321 I LOGAN, UT 84321 I ^ a a ^ MyConumwoftEipm Jur»2S.tW7 • 
^ StafcofUtah v 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a copy of the 
foregoing Affidavit to the Cache County Prosecutor's Office, 
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(In chambers - 9:25 a.m.) 
THE COURT: All right. This is the case of State 
of Utah vs. Robert Gene Hangartner. The time is 9:25. 
I 
This matter was set to go to trial at nine o'clock* 
The two attorneys are here in chambers with the court 
discussing the situation. 
Mr. Perry, if you will, describe the 
condition of your client for the record, please. 
MR. PERRY: Mr. Hangartner «eems inebriated this 
1 
morning. (Inaudible) 
THE COURT: And, Mr, Wyatt, you've had some 
communication with the defendant, is that correct? 
MR. WYATT: Your Honor, I sat down and talked to 
him and I said you're drunk. He said T know. You 
could smell alcohol on his body six feet away from 
him. So I think he's fairly inebriated. 
The concern that I have is that, my 
overriding concern, is that this case is two years 
old. It's been continued four or five times because 
of the condition of the defendant. I think we need to 
get this thing over with. 
THE COURT: Do you think it will take two days to 
try? 
MR. WYATT: I'm going to do everything I can to 
do it in one day, but I don't know. I've got a lot of 








wi tnesses . 
THE COURT: What if I were to have the defendant 
incarcerated for a time and then this afternoon we 
pick the jury? That would give him some time to get 
sobered up. 
MR. PERRY: That may be -- I'd like to have him a 
little bit sober. I don't think he would appreciate 
being incarcerated, but probably it would be better if 

















i THE COURT: Well, Mr. Hangartner hasn't any 
j choices anymore. He is going to jail. We'll not 
! 
I start our trial this morning. He's going to jail this 
jmorning and sober up and whatever else we got to do to 
i 
try this case. We're not going to continue it 
anymore. This has run on for two years. 
If he's totally snockered, will five hours 
do it, if we continued to 1:30? I hate to keep 
plyaing with these jurors. Of all of the jurors that 
we've had, I've probably had more better excuses from 
some of these jurors not to be here than I have before 
and I've not excused them. They have some very very 
important places to be. If they do and we're fooling 
around keeping them here for this guy coming in here 
drunk and fool around with the court. 
I mean, talk about abuse of the judicial 
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system. I just can't see it. Just because this guy 
2 I wants to be drunk we keep these very important people 
3 | from going about their daily affairs. There's three 
4 J of them that have some important things and places 
5 ! they want to be and things that they ought to be 
6 doing. 
7 MR. PERRY: I think the case can be tried in one 
i 
8 ! day. The State is only indicating five witnesses on 
9 ! their discovery sheet. 
t 
10 | MR. WYATT: Well, my preference would be to 
11 i proceed this morning. Get the jury in, put my case 
12 on. I think by the time the defense case comes we'd 
13 ! have presented enough (inaudible). 
14 i MR. PERRY: That's fine. 
I 
15 i MR. WYATT: I think that if he's makina a 
i 
16 ! decision to come to court drunk, let the jury 
17 i (inaudible). 
18 J THE COURT: Well, the only alternative, I 
19 suppose, would be to let this jury go home and come 
20 back tomorrow and see if we can get it in in one day. 
21 I And he'll be incarcerated until then. That way he can 
22 sober up. What is your preference, Mr. Perry? 
23 MR. PERRY: I would prefer that. 



























MR. WYATT: That's my preference. 
THE COURT: Tell me why. 
MR. WYATT: Every single time -- of course, if 
you incarcerate him he'll have a hard time doing 
something, but every time, as I review through the 
file, the continuances have all been as a result of 
something that he's done. It may not have been an 
intentional thing on his part, but something he's done 
so we couldn't proceed. He's either had a medical 
I thing, a trip to the hospital. Just, one thing and 
another. I think he's -- I don't know that he's 
necessarily intending this, to not go to trial, but I 
just hate to see it be continued. I respect the 
court's concerns about the case. 
THE COURT: Well, what I'm concerned with is to 
see that this person has a fair trial. If we put him 
before the jury this morning and he's intoxicated, I 
don't think there's any question but what, the jury --
we tell them to set aside their biases and prejudices 
(inaudible) in an inebriated condition. So, being 
fair to everyone, I think the best bet --
MR. WYATT: If we empanel the jury today and put 
on evidence tomorrow, then I think there's a good 
chance of one day. 
THE COURT: Mr. Perry, what about picking a jury 



























without your client present? 
MR. PERRY: Umm. --
THE COURT: What I'm concerned about is letting 
these people go this morning and then they can go 
about their duties and get something done. If I make 
them come back this afternoon, they've ruined the day. 
If we were to go ahead and proceed this morning and 
then let them go and have them come back tomorrow 
morn i ng. 
MR. PERRY: T prefer to have my client present in 
picking the jury, bur not in an intoxicated state, is 
what T would prefer. 
THE COURT: Let's see. Gary, they've had the 
film? 
THE CLERK: Yes. They've had the film and been 
paid for their appearance. 
MR. WYATT: If we swap seats -- this guy is not a 
stranger to alcohol. He can deal fairly well when 
he's intoxicated. If we swapped tables and I sit 
close to the jury, they are further away from the 
table: and his client sits on the opposite side of 
him. the jury is not going to detect that he's 
intoxicated. We can empanel the jury and send 
everybody home and then start first thing tomorrow 
morning with opening statements and evidence. Maybe 
1 
2 
that would be the best compromise. 
THE COURT: Well, to get the thing in in one day, 
3 | I suppose you're correct. All right. Let's do that. 
4 J Swap tables. And then that will give us an 
5 j opportunity to address your questions, or your 
6 arguments, too, on this motion in limine. After we 
7 empanel the jury we'll excuse them and then hear your 
8 I motions. That will take up some time that we can get 
9 j out of the road today. 
10 If there's any other matters that we can 
11 take care of today be thinking about it so we save 
12 , some time tomorrow. 
i 
13 . MR. PERRY: Is there a jury instruction, maybe, 
I 
14 on -- I haven't seen --
i 
15 | THE COURT: On disregarding the fact that your 
16 , client is inebriated? I haven't seen one like that 
17 ! either. 
18
 ( MR. PERRY: Can I see the packet maybe this 







THE COURT: You should have a copy out there. 
THE CLERK: There were no copies made for counsel 
of the jury instructions. 
THE COURT: Oh. Now, I will read the preliminary 
jury instructions. I think both of you are familiar 
with those, are you not? They're the stock ones that 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
) 




ROBERT GENE HANGARTNER ) 
) 
ORDER 
CASE NO: 941000108 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant of the above listed 
case be incarcerated in the Cache County Jail for the period of one night 
pending the completion of the Jury Trial scheduled on April 30, 1996 
and May 1, 1996. 
The Defendant will be transported to his motel "Super 8" of Logan 
to retrieve his medications and check out of the motel. 
The Defendant's medication is to be made available to him as 
prescribed by his doctors. 
DATED THIS the 30th day of April, 1996 
BY^SWE COURT 
MICRO FtLMfcD 
DATE: $ - < \ - % 
ROLL NUMBER: M-
Cache County, UT, DISTRICT/CIRCUIT COURT 
Div/Dept: 1 CTRM 2 
Judge: Clint S. Judkins 
Bailiff: Craig 
Tape Set No: April 30, 1996 
Date: 04/30/1996 
Clerk: GHF 
Case No: 941000108 FS 
Plaintiff: 
State of Utah 
Counsel: 
Donald G. Linton 
Defendant: 
Robert Gene Hangartner 
Counsel: 
David Perry 





















































































































APR 30, 1996 
.. APR 30, 1996 
TAPE START! Recording begins... APR 30, 1996 
TAPE STOP! Recording ends... APR 30, 1996 
TAPE START! Recording begins... APR 30, 1996 
Chambers Private Conference 
CT3 Normal operation resumed 
TAPE STOP1 Recording ends... 
TAPE START! Recording begins« 
Court calls case 
Preliminary remarks 
Prospective Jurors sworn 
Court conducts voir-dire 
Court and counsel to meet in chambers 
Chambers Private Conference 
CT3 Normal operation resumed 
Court conducts voir-dire continues 
State's voir-dire 
Defense voir-dire 
Jury panel passed for cause 
Attorneys conduct premptory challenge 
Jury seated and sworn 
Preliminary jury instructions read by the 
Court 
Court 





motion on rule 25 
two and a half months for original trial 
setting 
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sees no basis for the motion 
Court 
review of file and dates for hearings 
Denies motion on Rule 25 
ATD 
motion in limine re: knife 




to hear foundation on knife as evidence 
no motion to suppress at this time 
knife not be shown until accepted as evidence 
control actions with use of knife 
Court 
defendant to be placed in jail until tomorrow 
to avoid drunken appearance 
DEF 
high dose of medication 
need for medication prior to trial 
ATD 




Deputy to take to motel and then to jail 
ATD 
need to see that DEF have right doseage of 
medication 
Court 
it will be available at jail 
attorneys to return at 9 AM tomorrow 
TAPE STOP! Recording ends... APR 30, 1996 
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i? 
1 Very well. You're excused at this time. 
2 We'll see you back here tomorrow morning. 
3 Yes, we have one question in the back? 
4 UNIDENTIFIED JUROR: Do we have something to take 
5 -- are we supplied with something to take notes on or 
6 do we need to bring that? 
7 THE COURT: The clerk will provide you with some 
8 paper that you can write on tomorrow. Very well. 
9. j (Jury out of the courtroom.) 
10 I THE COURT: Now, T understand that we have some 
! 
I 
11 j motions that need to be made at this time, is that 
i 
12 j correct? 
13 MR. PERRY: There's an application that I'd first 
14 I like to address under Rule 25. I'd urge the court to 
15 adopt this application of rule -- under Rule 25 of the 
16 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. It empowers the 
17 court to, on its own application or by either party, 
18 | to request that the indictment, or information, be 
19 dismissed. 
20 Ifd like to make that application at this 
21 time, Your Honor. Initially, when this case was 
22 filed, it took two-and-a-half months for an initial 
23 trial date to occur, during which time Mr. Hangartner 
24 was incarcerated and was not able to post bail. Then 
2-5 it got continued again. 


















result of no fault of his own. Some of them, I think, 
have been from the State. Other ones have been as a 
result of his personal health and the weather 
conditions. But regardless of the reasons there could 
have been a trial shortly after he was incarcerated. 
It's now been almost two years since the incidents 
that have been alleged occurred. We'd like to request 
that the court at this point in time dismiss the case. 
THE COURT: Mr. Wyatt, your response. 
MR. WYATT: Your Honor, as I reviewed Rule 25 
quickly here this morning, I see no basis for this 
motion. There are four requirements that apply in 
this case. Sub B one, two, four and five. One 
requires an unreasonable or unconstitutional delay. 
It's very difficult to imagine how any of the delays 
could be unreasonable or unconstitutional since they 
18 |were all requested by the defendant or were all done 
19 !to accomodate the defendant. 
20 The second one, that the allegations in 
21 the indictment don't constitute the offense. That 
22 hasn't been alleged here. 
23 I Third, the court is without jurisdiction. 
24 That hasn't been alleged here. Fifth, the prosecution 
25 is barred by the statute of limitations. Again, that 
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1 hasn't been alleged here and doesn't apply. 
2 The only delays are reasonable and have 
3 been done to accommodate the defendant and we'd ask 
4 the court not to dismiss this as there are no grounds 
5 under Rule 25. 
6 THE COURT: Counsel, as I review the file, the 
7 | defendant was arraigned on June 8th of 1994. The 
8 preliminary hearing was set forthwith. At the 
9 insistence of the defendant -- and that was set on 
10 (June 22nd. (Pause.) The arraignment on the 8th of 
11 j June was continued until the 14th and an appointment 
12 was made of Mr. Perry to represent the defendant. 
13 On the 14th the court again reconvened and 
14 Mr. Perry was present at that time and had an 
15 opportunity to interview his defendant. A preliminary 
16 hearing was set within ten days. At that preliminary 
17 i hearing the defendant made a motion which made it 
18 necessary for the court to continue the preliminary 
19 hearing. That preliminary hearing was continued to 
20 the 15th of July and conducted in a timely fashion. 
21 The defendant was bound over to answer 
22 j concerning the charges. He appeared before the court 
23 i timely. A bail hearing was set. That arraignment 
24 occurred on August 1st before Judge Hadfield. The 












MR. WYATT: The arraignment was August 1st and 
the trial was set for August 22nd and 23rd. 
THE COURT: That's correct. Let's see what 
happened on the 22nd and 23rd. (Pause.) The jury was 
called and the court was ready to try the case. It is 
indicated to the court that there is a possible 
resolution. Apparently the defendant pled guilty to 
counts two and four. Counts one and three to be 
dismissed 30 days after sentencing. The defendant was 
released at that time. 
Sentencing was set for September 26th. At 
12 |that date the defendant did not appear. At the 
i 




continued to October 11th. because the defendant 
wasn't there. The court also at that time authorized 
that a bench warrant be issued if the State requested 









I think in the interim Mr. Perry filed — 
at least in behalf of the defendant a motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea was filed and on the 11th of 
October again the defendant was not present. Attorney 
for the defendant indicated that the defendant was 
hospitalized for two weeks and asked that the 
sentencing be continued. 
On the 24th of October the matter was 
i f ^ l n n f i 1 - P t r r o ^ O C 
1 brought before the court and the defendant was 
2 present. Apparently counsel met with Judge Low in 
3 chambers and the sentencing was continued to November 
4 7th- It's indicated that the motion to withdraw was 
5 still pending. 
6 j On the 7th of November defendant's counsel 
7 asked that the motion to withdraw be considered. 
8 Attorney for the plaintiff asked that they have 
9 additional time. 
10 Now, that's the first time I note in the 
11 record that the State asked for a continuance. That 
12 I was on November 7th, 1994, after the defendant pled 
13 guilty and then filed a motion to withdraw. The State 
14 finally asked that they be given some time to respond 
15 to that motion. 
16 I They did respond and on December 5th, 
17 j 1994, all parties were before the court. The court 
18 granted the motion to withdraw the guilty plea at that 
19 point in time. They set the trial for March 22nd, 
20 I 1995. 
21 Let's see. (Pause.) I'm not sure why, I 
22 I can't tell you why, but then it was continued from 
23 March to July 20th. I don't know if that was because 
24 of the court's calendar. I don't see any motion that 
25 was made at that point in time. But for whatever 
1 I reason, it was continued from the end of March of '95 
2 , to July. 
Then on May 19th Mr. Perry was present, as 
was Mr. Jenkins, who then represented the State. 
Well, okay. The matter was continued from March to 
May 25th for whatever reason. That I don't know. 
Then Mr. Perry appeared on May 19th and 
asked that the matter be continued from May 25th and 
26th to another date because his client was in the 
10 | hospital at that point in time. That's when it was 
11 set on June 5th for a review of the status of the 














On June 5th it was set for trial in July. 
Then that had to be bumped to August 2nd because, it 
would appear, the defendant was still not released 
from the hospital and needed consultation with his 
client, or with his attorney. It was then continued 
to January 18th for the same reason. 
On January 18th, as you'll recall, at that 
time the defendant was apparently in Arizona and 
couldn't get back up here because of the weather 
conditions. The court had to cancel the jury trial 
and we had a jury here that morning, as you'll recall. 
The matter was set for today. 
So the only delay that I can possibly see 
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1 that was in behalf of the State was a two month 
2 possible delay that was continued for the -- I think 
3 that was because the court schedule was such that it 
4 had to be bumped. Again, I don't know, I just suspect 
5 that. I don't see anything other than that. There 
6 was one delay in the matter where the State asked for 
7 some additional time to respond to the motion to 
8 withdraw the guilty plea. 
9 I Based on that, and that's just thumbing 
10 through the record, Mr. Perry, but I can't see where 
11 | the State is at fault in requesting any undue delays. 




13 | because of those delays. Therefore, the court will 
i 
14 I deny vour motion at this time. 
I 
15 ' Did you have another motion to make this 
16 morning? 
17 MR. PERRY: Yes. A motion in limine regarding 
18 the introduction of a knife in this case. At the 
19 preliminary hearing I understand that it was difficult 
20 to lay foundation for that knife. I'd just like to 
21 request that as they lay foundation for the knife that 
22 it not be in the presence of the jury. If the court 
23 wants to accept the knife into evidence, do so, but 
24 that the knife not be shown to the jury until it has 
25 been accepted into evidence because of the fact that 
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Addendum C 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff 
V. 
ROBERT GENE HANGARTNER 
Defendant 
ORDERED ENTERED 
Case No: 941000108 FS 
Judge Clint S. Judkins 
Court Reporter by Video 
Court Clerk GHF 
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